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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue No. 1

Was the trial court required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law when

modifying the parties' divorce decree? The interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d

1177, 1181 (Utah App. 1994). Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2000).
Issue No. 2

Did the trial court err by allowing the plaintiff to withdraw admissions made in

pretrial discovery and to present evidence regarding those issues at trial? The applicable
standard of review is a modified abuse of discretion standard established by Langeland v.
Monarch Motors. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah App. 1998). Defendant raised his objection to
admission of testimony on the relevant issues at trial (R. 530-3).
Issue No. 3

Did the trial court properly award the plaintiff one-half of the additional retirement
disbursement received by defendant? The standard of review for to overturn a trial

court's modification of a decree of divorce is a showing that "the evidence clear.y
preponderates against the findings or that the trial court has abused its discretion."

Thompson v. Thompson. 709 P.2d 360. 362 (Utah 1985).
Issue No. 4

Did the trial court properly award $6,000 to plaintiff as alimony due to defendant's
receipt of disability income'1 The standard of review for to overturn a trial court's

modification of a decree of divorce is a showing that "the evidence clearlv preponderates
against the findings or that the trial court has abused its discretion." Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360. 362 (Utah 1985 i.
Issue No. 5

Did the trial court properly refuse to modify defendant's alimony obligation'1 The
standard of review for to overturn a trial court's modification of a decree of divorce is a

showing that "the evidence clearlv preponderates against the findings or that the trial
court has abused its discretion." Thompson v. Thompson. 709 P.2d 360. 362 (I 'tali
1985).

Issue No. 6

Did the trial court properly grant the "Protective Order" without allowing the
defendant an opportunity to respond the underlying motion'' The question of whether the

court erred in granting the motion without an opportunity to respond is governed by Rule
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and is therefore a matter of statutorv
construction which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Petersen. 8 10 P.2d 42 1. 424

(Ltah 1991). Defendant has never waived any objection to the issuance of the protective
order, and was never given an opportunitv' to object before the motion was granted.

Issue No. 7

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for summary judgment1? The
grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.
Thompson v. Jess. 979 P.2d 322. 325 (Utah 1999).
Issue No. 8

Did the trial court properly award attorneys fees to the plaintiff} The decision to
award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the trial court's sound

discretion. Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836. 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE RULES

Rule 9. Pleading special matters.

(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued

or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party When a party
desires to raise an issue as lo the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any partv
to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity,
he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarlv within the pleader's knowledge, and on such issue the partv
relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the
trial.

(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a partv does not know the
name of an adverse party', he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such

adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, provided.
that when the true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or pmceeding
must be amended accordingly.

(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an
action to quiet title vvhereir. any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown."

the pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown,
claiming any right, title, estate or interest in. or lien upon the real properly described in
the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity'. Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.

(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made
specifically and with particulanty. and when so made the party' pleading tlie performance
or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or
occurrence.

(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient
to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court,
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the
judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A
denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made
the party pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted
jurisdictional facts.

(f) Time and place. For tlie purpose of testing tlie sufficiency of a pleading,
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments
of material matter.

(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, thev shall be
specifically stated.
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to
state the facts showing the defense but it mav be alleged generally that the cause of action

is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on. referring to or describing such statute
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any. or otherwise
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify' it. If such allegation
is controverted, the party'' pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts
showing that the cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an
ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or
ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its
passage or by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the

statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof
(j) Libel and slander.
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary- m an action for libel or
slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the
defamatory' matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally' that
the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff If such allegation is
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it
was so published or spoken.
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the

defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and anymitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the
justification or not. he mav »ive in evidence tlie mitiizatine circumstances.

Rule 36. Request for admission.
(a) Request for admission.
(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the

admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of tlie truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or
of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in
the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom
the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unle.v>
said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within such
shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of documents shall be served with
the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available fin-

inspection and copying. Without leave of court or written stipulation, requests for
admission may not be served before the time specified in Rule 26(D).
(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set

forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty' days after service of the request, or
within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request
is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection
addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney', but. unless the court
shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before
the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him If
objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically- deny
the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party' cannot truthfully

admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested
admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only- a
part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may' not give lack of
infonnation or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny- unless he states that he

has made reasonable inquirv and that the infonnation known or readily obtainable by him
is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party' who considers that a matter of
which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that
ground alone, object to the request; lie may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37 (c). denv
the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it.
(3) The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the

sufficiency of tlie answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is
justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer

does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is
admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these orders,
determine that final disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a
designated time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the awaid of
expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

(b) Fffect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively

established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the

admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order,
the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when tlie presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and tlie party- who obtained the admission fails to satisfy
the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense on the merits. Any admission made by a party under tins rule is for the purpose
of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor mav
it be used against him in any other proceeding.
Rule 52. Findings by the court.

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially- and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A, in granting or refusing
interlocutory- injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary' for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunitv of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses
The findings of a master, to tlie extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (bl. 56. and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
lb) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion mav be made with a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without
a juiy. the question of the sufficiency- of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fxcept in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue
of fact;

(1} by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent m open court, entered in the minutes.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-

claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may. at any time after the expiration of 20 davs
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary'judgment
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment
in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party' against whom a claim, counterclaim, or ciossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or

without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or anv part
thereof

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall

be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits., if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to anv material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory' in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone

although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment i>
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the

court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist

without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

Ihe court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed bv depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Ifhe does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.

(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits ofa partv
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a

continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery- to
be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any- time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely- for the purpose of delay, tlie court shall forthwith order the parryemploying them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party' or attorney' may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 4-501. Motions.

(1) Filing arid service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or exparte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions o\

depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion.
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2). except a>>
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to
file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal
memorandum, and rf the memorandum is in excess often pages, the application shall
include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding parly shall file and
sene upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in

opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding partv fails
to file a memorandum in opposition to tlie motion within ten days after service of the
motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (1)(D| of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a replymemorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day- period to
file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the
court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of

mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.

(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support o{
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The
facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically- refer to those
portions of the record upon which the movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in

opposition to a motion for summary' judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists.
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of the record upon which tlie opposing partv relies, and, if
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are

disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported bv
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summaiv
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.

(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered bv
the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below
(B) In cases where tlie granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any
claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the
principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion mav file a written
request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or

opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.

(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting
party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or
notify the requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting panv shall
schedule the matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.

(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy' copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before
the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and ndicate
the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.

(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their
principal memoranda, a hearing on :he motion shall be deemed waived.

(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of
the court.

(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition, the moving party' may withdraw the request or the court on
its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion without oral argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court
may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence

and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) lelephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct
arguments of any motion bv telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by

counsel.

STATEMENT OF THE CASK
I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the trial court's modification of a decree of divorce.
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on April 18. 1997 (R. ^-1~). The
parties executed a written stipulation regarding the issues of their divorce (R. 23-3o. 40-

3 ). The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Div oree
on May 21. 1997 (R. 46-76).

Plaintiff filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce in August. 199" (R.
"9-89). Defendant also filed a petition to modify the decree on January ". 1998 <j<. 1249). which was later amended (R. 163-"0).

Trial was conducted on both petitions to modify on January 14. 1999. The court
entered an "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce" on November 22. 1999 (R. 485-8). The

trial court entered an order on February 28. 2000, enlarging the time for plaintiff to file
his appeal (R. 508-9).
III. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

The trial court, in its "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce"" allowed the plaintiff to
withdraw requests for admissions which had previously been admitted, awarded

additional alimony to the plaintiff, awarded her '-: of defendant's retirement program
which had been awarded to him in the decree, modified defendant's nidus of visitation

due to his relocation, and awarded plaintiff her attorneys fees and costs. (R. 485-8). The
court made no findings of fact and conclusions of law.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 10, 1973 (R. 294). Thev had
five children, two of whom were adults when this action was commenced (R. 47)

The parties entered into a Chapter 13 bankruptcy' plan approximately two years
prior to their separation (R. 637). The monthly' obligation under the bankruptcy decree
was S3.500 per month (R. 637).

The plaintiff left the parties" home in Idaho with the three minor children in early
1997. and relocated to Cedar City, Utah (R. 639). The defendant was unaware of the

whereabouts of his wife and children (R. 621). Due to this fact, the defendant became

depressed and was unable to work (R. 621). This was diagnosed with depression and

forced to terminate his employment, where he had been making about S250.000 per veai
(R. 62 1). Once the defendant located his wife and children, he relocated to Southern

Utah for the sole puipose of being closer and having contact with the children >;R. 621-2).

Defendant applied for licensure as a physician in Utah, but his application was
delayed and later denied (R. 622).

The parties stipulated to the terms of a decree of divorce, which was entered on

May- 21, 1997 (R. 62-76). At the time the stipulation was entered into, the defendant was
unrepresentative by counsel (R. 62). Plaintiffs counsel drafted the decree (R. 62).

The parties were awarded joint legal custody of the children, with plaintiff being
designated the primary custodian and defendant being awarded statutory visitation (R.

63), Despite the fact that he was unemployed, tlie defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff
$900 in child support per month (R. 65). In tlie event defendant gamed emplovment as a
physician and. or surgeon, child support was to be increased to S 1.500 and. m addition,

plaintiff was to be awarded alimony of SI.500 per month (R. 66). The decree provided
that both this award and the original child support award were "subject to judicial review

at tlie appropriate request of either party, without either or both being required to
establish any substantial change of material circumstances . . ." (R. 65-6). Both parties

were enjoined from claiming that there was not any substantial change of circumstances
with respect to any proposed increase or decrease of child support and or alimonv. (R.
"3).

The defendant was required to pav all of the debts of the parties, including their
Chapter 13 bankruptcy payments (R, 68).

The decree provided that defendant was awarded the parties' interest in "whatever
retirement programs may exist", and was allowed to use those funds to make the parties

(liapter 13 Bankruptcy payments, pay their other obligations, or pav the plaintiff support.
(R. 68).

In the parties negotiations leading up to their settlement, the defendant represented
that his claims for disability had been denied but that he was reapplying (R. 525). Fie
also stated that he believed there was Si2.000 to S 14.000 in his retirement account (R.

In June of 1997. defendant's application for disability was approved and additional
sums were deposited into his retirement account (R. 525, 527). Both of these events took

place after the decree was entered.

The plaintiff filed a petition to modify the decree to obtain one-half of additional

funds in the retirement account and the disability payments (R. 79-89). as well as other

relief. The petition does not plead fraud or mistake with particularity, and defendant
raised that defense in his answer (R. 94).

Defendant served a discovery' request upon plaintiff on October 23. 1997.
including requests for admissions (R. 99). On December 2. 1997, defendant served a

motion to compel discovery, seeking the interrogatives and requests for production of

documents (R. 188-20). The motion to compel was not opposed, and was submitted for

decision on May 4. 1998 (R. 154-5). The coun entered an order compelling the plaintiff
to respond to the interrogatories and request for production of documents on May 19,
1998 (R. 156-7).

While it is evident from the record that the plaintiffs counsel sought an extension
of the time to respond to discovery, it is as evident that no extension was granted, and

that defendant's counsel vigorously sought a response to the pending discovery- (R. 42464).

Defendant finally served answers to the discover request on July 13. 1998. more
than 18 months after they were due {R. 242).

Defendant filed a petition to obtain custody of the parties" oldest minor child in

January of 1998 (R. 124-9) "the court granted defendant temporary custody of the child
(R. 140-1). The child turned 18 prior to a final order being entered.

Defendant maintains that his denial of licensure in Utah was due in large part to

tlie false reports of the plaintiff to the Division o( Professional Licensing (R. 168). The
defendant was forced to relocate to Idalio. and made substantially less money than he had
contemplated making in Southern Utah or elsewhere. While the defendant was able to

find a job in Idaho, after the bankruptcy payment of S3,500 per month, child support o\"
S1.500 per month, taxes, and alimony of Si.500 per month (for a total of S6.000). he did
not have enough remaining to live on (R. 168).

Consequently, the defendant amended his petition to modify the decree to include
a claim seeking to reduce his alimony obligation and alter his visitation with the two
children still in plaintiffs care due to the relocation (R. 163-70). The court held an

evidentiary hearing on temporary orders, where it heard evidence regarding these issues.

The court's order clarified some of the visitation issues but denied the requested
reduction in alimony (R. 140-1 ).

The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of the
retirement account and the disability income, supported by the admissions and the
plaintiffs pleadings (R. 253-68). The plaintiffs response did not reply to each disputed
fact in a separate numbered sentences and did not specifically refer the record, and did
not state the numbered sentence or sentences of"the movant's facts which were disputed
(R. 273-6). Although the relevant facts had been admitted by plaintiff, the court denied
the motion. No written order was entered.

The defendant subpoenaed a representative of the State of Utah to appear at trial,
and testify regarding plaintiffs efforts to have tlie defendant's application for licensure
denied (R. 380-3). The Department of Professional Licensure filed a motion for a
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protective order, which the court granted without giving the defendant an opportunitv to

respond (R. 3 15-352, 375-7). The order was signed only four business days after it was
filed.

Trial was held on January 14 1999. At trial, the defendant oluected to tlie trial

court receiving evidence contrary to the requests for admissions (R. 530-3), The trial
court elected to hear the evidence ard decide later whether the evidence was admissible.

The discovery request was admitted into evidence (R. 624)
At trial, the plaintiff could produce no evidence that defendant, at the time the

decree was entered, had knowledge that the disability' would be granted or that the
retirement disbursement would be forthcoming (R. 571-3).

After paying the bankruptcy payment, paying child support, and meeting his basic
living expenses, defendant did not have the ability' to pay alimony (R. 542).

The trial court, in its "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce", allowed the plaintiff
to withdraw her admissions, awarded plaintiff$6,000 in alimony for the disability income
received by defendant, awarded plaintiff one-half of the retirement disbursement, and
granted her other relief.

The court had allowed the plaintiff to file memorandum regarding whether the

admissions should be withdrawn. The plaintiff introduced affidavits claiming there had
been extension of time to respond (R. 411-6). The defendant denied the same. :md

produced documentation that, although plaintiffs counsel had requested an extension on
several occasions, the same had never been granted, and that the defendant had requested
in numerous correspondence that the discovery be completed and sought a motion to
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compel discovery (R. 420-3). The court made no findings on this issue in its final order,
other than to allow the plaintiff to withdraw her admissions.
The court denied defendant's motion to modify the alimony award, but allowed
the defendant some additional visitation.

The court, in addition, awarded plaintiff $6,800 in attorneys fees.
The court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in making its order.
This final order was not entered until November, 1999, 10 months after trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This court can not properly- review this matter as the trial court did not issue anv

findings of fact and conclusions of law. These are required in divorce modifications
under Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985) and Rule 52(b). Utah R. Civ. P.
(2000).

The trial court improperly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw requests for
admissions made prior to trial. .Although tlie court made no findings regarding this issue,
given the evidence presented the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Langeland v.
Monarch Motors. Inc.. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998).

The court found that defendant had misrepresented tlie amount of his disability
payments and retirement account. However, because this was a stipulated decree, to
succeed on these issues the plaintiff must show fraud on tlie part of defendant. Land v.
Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) and Kinsman v. Kmsman.748 P.2d 210 (Utah App.

1988). Plaintiff did not plead fraud, and admitted at trial that she had no evidence that
defendant knew the statements to be untrue. There was therefore no misrepresentation.
i
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The trial court denied defendant's petition to reduce alimony and awarded plaintifl
attorneys fees, findings as to the financial abilities of die parties is required for such a

determination. The court failed make such findings, and tlie case must be remanded on
these issues. Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978); Willey v. Willey. S66

P.2d 547. 555 (Utah App. 1993); Chandler v. West. 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah !9S0).

Finally', defendant filed a motion summary'judgment. Because plaintiff had failed

to respond to discovery, no facts were in dispute. In any case, defendant did not proper Iv
respond to the motion under Rule 56. Utah R. Civ. P. (2000), or Rule 4-501. Utah Code
of Jud. Admin. (2000).
ARGUMENT

I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. TRIAL COURT REQUIRED TO MAKE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts

specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon"". No oral findings were
made by the court and no findings appear in any opinion or memorandum of decision

tiled bv the court. There was no waiver of the entry of findings was made pursuant to
Rule 52(e), which in any case may not have been possible because this was a divorce
action.

B. CASE LAW REQUIRES FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

In Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985). the wife was seeknui to
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modify tlie original stipulated decree. The parties had been married for almost 30 years
Although the trial court ruled that tlie change in circumstances in this case required
modification, no supporting findings of fact were entered. The court in Montova held
that:

This Court has held that adequate written findings and conclusions of law "aid the
appellate court in the exercise of the discretion it enjoys to review and. if
necessary-, to adjust the financial and property interests of the parties." Stoddard v.
Stoddard t:tah, 642 P.2d "43, ~44 <1982) (citing U.C.A.. 1953. § 30-3-5). As we
noted in that case, the trial court's decision in actions of this sort "may
significantly affect tlie economic welfare and standard of living of the parties ....
for many years." Id. at "45. It is essential that such determinations be based on
proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, the trial court's
failure to enter proper findings does not fulfill Utah R. Civ, P. 52(a). winch

requires that the trial court specifically find the facts and separately state its
conclusions of law in every action tried upon the facts without a juiv. Stoddard
held that actions to modify- a divorce decree are not exempt from this requirement
642 P. 2d at ~44.

696 P.2d at 1194-5.

In Stoddard v. Stoddard. 642 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the wife sought to modify the
decree by increasing the husband's child support obligation. The trial court made certain
cursory factual findings supporting the modification, but did not enter anv written

findings. The court held that "However, we have concluded that court action on a requeM
to modify a divorce decree should not be included among those 'decisions of motions'

referred to in fin Rule 52(a)] so as to exempt the trial court from the general requirement"
to make findings.
A contested petition for modification of a divorce decree is an action tried upon

the facts and requires findings of fact and conclusions of law. Parish v. Parish, 35 P.2d
999 (Utah 1934); Codv v. Codv. 154 P. 952 (Utah 1916). More recently, in Chandlery.
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West. 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a district court
which refused to modify a stipulated property' settlement incorporated in the divorce
decree but gave no explanation for its refusal and made no findings of fact. Insiructmg
the tnal court to enter proper findings of fact and conclusions of" law on remand, the court
stated:

When a party, as in the instant case, presents a prima facie case of changed
circumstances which basically raises a serious question as to [tlie] fairness and
equity' of continuing the financial obligations of one party, the court's

determination that modification of a decree is nevertheless inappropriate should be
based on written findings and conclusions. Written findings and conclusions are
just as necessary for the modification of child support as for the alteration or
nonalteration of property settlement arrangements.
Ji at 1301.
C. APPELLATE COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS OPINION FOR
TRIAL COURT

Although the appellate court has power in an equity' case such as this to weigh the
evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, Wilson v. Wilson, 296
P.2d 977. 981 (U'tah 1956), the court should decline to do so where it has no means of

knowing upon which facts the tnal judge relied in entering his judgment, '['his is
especially true where tlie record is deficient. For example, in Montova v. Montova. 696
P.2d 1193. 1195 (Utah 1985). no mention

is made in the record of the specific needs of Mrs. Montoya. of her income from
other sources (such as welfare or unemployment compensation benefits), of any

income Mr. Montoya might nave aside from his pension (such as from his property
in New Mexico), or of his current living expenses. This Court has sta:ed that the
criteria for determining reasonable alimony include the financial condition and
needs of the wife, her ability to support herself, and the ability- of the husband to

provide support, tlramme v. (Jramme, Utah, 5S" P.2d 144, I4~ (prK); English v
English. Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (197j. Only the second of" these three

factors appears to be adequately developed in the record, and we are at a loss,
without his findings, to know how tlie tnal judge arrived at the figure he reached.
Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1985).

In certain instances, the appellate court may exercise equitable powers and take

upon itself the responsibility of weighing tlie evidence and making its own findings o(
fact. Willev v. Willey 951 P.2d 226 ('Utah 1997). However, this exception must not
become merely a guise under which an appellate court substitutes its own judgment for
that of the trial court. Alta Pacific Assocs. v. State Ta.x Comm'n. 931 P.2d 103. 1P

(Utah 1997), The appellate court must have a valid reason to take this extraordmaiv step
and then only' when the appellate court is in an equal position with the trial court with
respect to the facts and evidence at issue.
The trial court is much better suited to make those decisions. Willev v Willev.

951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997), 233-4. Indeed, the Supreme Court has uniformly required a
manifest injustice before an appellate court may take it upon itself to make its own

determinations. Although the court in Willev was aware of the unfortunate length and
expense of tins litigation, it found would be a greater injustice to the judicial system as a

whole if we were to allow an appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
tnal court, which is better positioned for such a task. The court in Willev further held
that:

We reaffirm what this court stated in Owen and in many cases since—the trial
court is in the best position to evaluate evidence and make findings of fact. This
case is not one of such unusual or extraordinary- circumstances as to require the
court of appeals to usurp the prerogative of the trial court and make its own
mdependent determinations of alimony and attorney fees. However, even if this
had been such a case, the court of appeals erred in failing to make findings of fact
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to support its conclusions.
Id. at 235. Sec also Reese v. Reese. 984 P.2d 987 (Utah 1999).
II. WITHDRAWAL OF ADMISSIONS
A.

RILL 36

In this matter, defendant served a discovery request, the response to winch was
filed more than a year and a half late. Rule 36(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
provides that:

Each matter of which an admission is requested ... is admitted unless, within thirty day s
after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court mav allow.

the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the partv requesting the admission a
written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party' or bv his attorney
Rule 36(b) provides in pertinent part:

An>' matter admitted undei this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion

permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. . , . The court may permit withdrawal
or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or

amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
B. THE REQUESTS EOR ADMISSIONS

On appeal, the relevant requests for admissions are numbers one through three.
They request the plaintiff to admit that:

1. Admit that, as par of the settlement negotiations which led to the parties
stipulation in this case, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he had a policy or
policies for disability insurance in early May of 1997,
2. Admit that, as part of the settlement negotiations which led to the parties
stipulation in this case, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he was currently
not receiving disability' income but that he might receive such income in the future.
3. Admit that, as pari of the settlement negotiations which led to the parties
stipulation in this case, the defendant notified the plaintiff that there was
approximately $14,000 in his retirement account, but that other funds could be

deposited in that account in the future.
(R. 105). Because die plaintiffs claim is that the defendant did not disclose the
possibility titat he might receive disability income or additional retirement funds, the
requests for admissions would show that defendant did disclose that possibility and there
was therefore no misrepresentation. As this is the basis of plaintiff s claims, the

admissions would prevent her from pursuing those causes of action.
C. CASE LAVA

The tnal court has the discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of

admissions when the presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the
party obtaining the admissions fails to satisfy- the court that he will be prejudiced in
maintaining his action. The tnal court does not have discretion to unilaterally disregard
the admissions. Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr.. Inc., 702 P.2d 98. 100 (Utah 1985): see
also Whitakerv. Nikols. 699 P.2d 685. 686-87 (Utah 1985); Burnetii v. Mascaro. 854

P.2d 555. 558 (Utah App. 1993).
In Langeland v. Monarch Motors. Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). Monarch did

not respond to requests for admission in a timely manner, and Langeland motioned for
summary-judgment. The trial court granted Monarch's motion to withdraw the
admissions. The supreme court held that:
Because the trial court's decision to grant a rule 36(b) motion is not entirely
discretionary, our review of such a decision is not a typical review for "abuse of
discretion." Instead. we review these decisions in two steps, using what might be
called a "conditional" discretionary' standard. In the first step, we review the trial
court's determinations as to whether amendment or withdrawal would serve tlie

presentation of tlie merits and whether amendment or withdrawal would result in
prejudice to the nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's

discretion to grant or deny die motion. The trial court has discretion to denv a
motion to amend, but its discretion to grant such a motion comes into plav only
after the preliminary requirements are satisfied. Decisions placed within the
discretron of the tnal court can be reversed only upon a finding of abuse of
discretion, i.e., if there is no reasonable basis for ihe decision. ('rookstt.n v. lure

Ins. Pxch., S60 P.2d 93", 938 (Utah 1993). But because the rule does not give the
trial court discretion to disregard the preliminary conditions of rule 36(bV its
judgment as to whether those conditions have been satisfied is subject to a
somewhat more exacting standard of review.

952 P.2d at 1060-1. The court went on to hold that the party- who is seeking to have the
admissions withdrawn bears die burden of proof on the matter. 952 P.2d at 1062.
In regards to the first issue, the court in Langeland held that:
To show that a presentation of the merits of an action would be served be

amendment or withdrawal of an admission, the party- seeking amendment or
withdrawal must (1) show that the matters deemed admitted against it are relevant
to the merits of the underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce some evidence bv
affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted
against it are in fact untrue.

952 P.2d at 1062. In that case. Monarch disputed the admissions, it lacked "anv sort of

detailed articulation of such arguments and is entirely devoid of evidence of specific facts
contradicting die admissions'" and the "record is devoid of anv sworn statement that
admission No. 2 is untrue." The court held that the admission could not be withdrawn.
D. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THIS CASE
1. No Evidence That Admissions Untrue

It is undoubtedly true that the admissions in the instant matter go to the merits oi~
the underlying action. How/ever, the plaintiff has introduced no evidence that the

admissions arc untrue. The affidavits supporting the request to withdraw the admissions
are all from plaintiffs counsel, and do not eo to the underlying truthfulness of the

-.i

admissions (R. 411-6).

In any case, tlie admission does not conflict with plaintiffs testimony at trial. She
testified that defendant had told her that his application for disability' had been denied, but
that he would reapply but that the chances of getting any money- were minimal (R. 549).
It is also clear from tlie record that the disability claim was not approved until several
months after the settlement negotiations (R. 571).

The testimony- introduced at tnal does

not contradict the admission, in fact it reinforces it.
The sam is true for the retirement account. The defendant testified at tnal that she

was told there was $12,000 to $14,000 in the account (R. 551-2). She did not testify that

the defendant did not tell her of possibility that "other funds could be deposited in tlie
account." There is no direct contradiction of the admission, and therefore, as in
Monarch, no actual evidence that the admission is untrue.

2. Prejudice to Defendant

The defendant is greatly prejudiced by allowing die admissions to be withdrawn.

He appeared at trial, expecting these issues to be settled. The court allowed the plaintiff
to introduce evidence contrary to the admissions. The plaintiff was unprepared to put on
a case regarding these issues.
III. RETIREMENT ACCOUNT

A. PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW MISREPRESENTATION

The parties in this matter reached a settlement agreement regarding the issues of
their divorce, which is an enforceable contract.
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On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for

relief is a showing of substantial change in the circumstances of the parties occurring
since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself See Haslam v.

Haslam. 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982); Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 197"). The

burden with respect to modifications of divorce decrees based on stipulated settlement
agreements, as is the case here, rs particularly high. 1and v I.and. 605 P.2d 12 48 (1980)
Court's are reluctant to distuib property settlement agreements. In the recent case

of Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), this Utah Supreme Court stated:

True it is that, in making a division of property' by a decree of divorce a trial court
is governed by general principles of equity. It is likewise true that the court retains

continuing jurisdiction over the parties and may modify' the decree due to a change
in circumstances, equitable considerations again to govern. It must, however, be
added that, when a decree is based upon a property settlement agreemenr, forged
by the parties and sanctioned by the court, equity- must take such agreement into
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain made.
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where a
property- settlement agreement has been incorporated into the decree, and the

outright abrogation of the provisions of such an agreement is only to be resorted
to with great reluctance and for compelling reasons.

Similarly, in Lea v. Bowers,, 658 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983), the trial court had modified a
stipulated decree without any findings of fraud. The case was reversed.

Likewise, in Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1980). the wife

relied upon the husband's statement of the value of some property in settling the matter
As here, she made no effort to verify those amounts. The court held that nonfraudulent

misrepresentatron by the husband did allow her to avoid the stipulation, 'the court stated
that:

While we are not generally unsympathetic to the position of the plaintiff, we cannot now
upset a stipulated property' settlement because of her having relied upon values funiished
by her husband in an adversary proceeding nor because she was without funds to hire an
appraiser of her own. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court committed no error in

not disturbing the stipulated property settlement of the parties under these circumstances
619 P.2d at 1373-4.

C. REQUIREMENTS TO PROVE FRAUD

The elements of an action in deceit based on fraudulent misrepresentation
are: (Da representation; (2) concerning a presently existing materia! fact: (3) which was
false: (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,

knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation: (5)

for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other partv. acting
reasonably' and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was therebyinduced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. Pace v. Parrish. 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952).
In order to prevail on a claim of fraud, all the elements of fraud must be

established by clear and convincing evidence, Cheever v. Schramm. 577 P.2d 951. 954
(Utah 1978).
D.

FRAUD NOT PLEAD

Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that fraud be plead. Mere

conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding

facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary judgment. Norton v Blackham.
669 P,2d 857. 859 (Utah 1983); Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 932. 915 (Utah 1974).

Here the defendant raised that objection at tnal and m the pleadings (R. 94. 649). The

26

plaintiff in her pleadings only says that there was misrepresentation regarding tlie
retirement account. She does not say that the statement was intentional or that defendant
had any knowledge that the statements were false.
E. STIPULATION IS CLEAR AND NO EXTRINSIC FAT DEM E NECESSARY

The stipulation in this ease provides that defendant is to receive the retirement
account. Where possible, die underlying intent of a contract is to be gleaned from the

language of the instrument itself; only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous need
extrinsic evidence be resorted to. Oberhanslv v. Farle. 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977);

Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart. 417 P.2d 761 (Utah 1966). No such ambiguity is

present in this case, nor wa> it asserted. Also, the mere fact that the parties urge diverse

definitions of contract terminology does not, per se, render it ambiguous. Camn_v\
Deseret Mutual Benefit Ass'n.. 589 P.2d 780 (Utah 1979). Defendant is asking the court
to modify the stipulation to provide that there is a cap on the amount that could be in the
account. If that were what the parties had intended, they should have included such a
provision in the stipulation
E. FACTS OF THIS CASE

With regards to the retirement fund, plaintiff testified as follows:
A

I was told by Jim Marriott that - the manager of the clinic - that there was
about $12,000. if I closed out my account there was about S12.000. as of.
you know, January or right around there, because, you know, when she left
and everything kind of fell apart and I couldn't work and so on and so forth.

I was thinking of using that as income .... lie told me that the proportion i
would get would be about $12,000 to $14,000 depending on how much
thev held out in taxes
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Q

Now when you made that representation to Mr. Bishop and vour ex-wife -

A

Yes.

Q

- did vou believe that to be true0

A

I did.'

Q

Okay. Now. its true that sometime later you found out there was more

money in there0
A

That's true.

Q
A

When did you find that out0
Boy. I don't know. I can't remember off the top of mv head. But it would

be I go - I don't know. 1think the first time I got it was right around in June
(R. 626-7). Defendant further testified that the board of the clinic did not determine how

much was to be paid to tlie physicians for their retirement program until March or April.

after the end of their fiscal year on February 28th.

Funds would not actually be paid

until June or July- (R. 627-8).

0

So the amount of money- that is actually- in that account as of February 28t!l

is not really known until June or Julv?
A
Q

Exactly.
So you couldn't have known, how much, if there was more that S14.000 in
that policy until June or Julv0

A

No. I had to take Mr. Marriott's word for it.

Q

And, again, when you said there was 12 to $14,000. do you have any

A

Absolutely not.

infonnation to the contrary.

(R. 628-9).

Plaintiffs former counsel at trial testified that, during the settlement negotiations

diat there was $12,000 available or $14,000 available to him in his retirement program
(R. 538-9). This is identical to defendant's testimony.
At trial, defendant's testimony regarding this issues was that "Dale had said that he

had $12,000. maybe $14,000, but not more than that, and that he needed it to pay off
some bills" and that "there was only between $12,000 and $14,000. and that there wasn't
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any' other funds anyplace else." (R. 551-2). The plaintiff testified that she made no effort
to verify these numbers (R. 567).
At trial, the plaintiff admitted that she had no evidence that Dr. Mosdeli knew the
balance of the retirement account had more than $14,000 in it until after the decree was
entered (R. 572-3).

This case falls squarely within the principle set forth in Land v. I and. 605 P.2d

1248 (Utah 1980). 'there was a stipulated decree. The defendant told the plaintiff thai
there was 12 to $14,000 in his retirement account. "Phis turned out not to be true, or that

additional funds would be deposited in the account. However, the plaintiff has made no
showing that the defendant knew this to be untrue. The defendant was merely reciting
what he had been told in January, the last time he checked. Where the issue was not
properly plead and the plaintiff produced no evidence of fraudulent intent, certainly not

by clear and convincing evidence, the conclusions of the trial court should be reversed.
IV.

DISABILITY INCOME

A. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO INCREASE ALIMONY

The requirements to modify the alimony obligation is similar to property
distributions. Kinsman, v. Kinsman. 748 P.2d 210 (Ltah 1988). In Kinsman, the parties
had stipulated that neidier would receive alimony, the wife later petitioned the court to

modify the decree and award her alimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the granting oi'
the award. After reciting that the wife must show a substantial change of circumstances
and held that: "to base the award of alimony on changed circumstances ignores the
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finality- of the terms of the stipulation which should only be overturned 'with great
reluctance and for compelling reasons'", citing Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)
The court declined "to hold that a change of circumstances can overcome a knowing and
specific waiver in a stipulation." 748 P.2d at 212. In a footnote, the court went on to
state that:

To hold that a change of circumstances can overcome a stipulation in all cases . . .
opens the door to abuse. Nothing would prevent a party from negotiating a
favorable settlement in exchange for a waiver of alimonv and sometime later.
having enjoyed the benefit of the agreement and having dissipated the assets
awarded, coming back to court to obtain alimony on a change of circumstances.
Such a rule would encourage fraud and deception and would eliminate the efficacy

of stipulated settlements. All divorces would be contested in the hope of
establishing finality and preventing future litigation over those matters established
in court.

748 P.2d at 212. These principles apply to this case. The defendant notified die plaintiff
that he had a disability policy, and that his application had been denied. He also made it
clear that he was going to reapply'. In the decree, he received that income stream, and

bore the risk that it would not produce. Now that it has produced, the plaintiff wishes to
go back on tlie agreement and get part of that income that she bargained awav.
B. FACTS OE THIS CASE

The settlement discussions took place in May and the settlement agreements were
executed on May 2 and May 12. 3997.

Defendant's testimony at tnal regarding the disability income is as follows:
A

I told them that I had been denied the disability and that I was reapplying

for it. But I didnT know whether I would receive any- of it . . .

Q
Now. so when you were talking to them [plaintiff and her counsel] in May.
you at that time, you were not receiving or planned to receive or couldn't rely on
that you were going to receive any disability'1
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A
Could not rely on it. I didn't know that I would receive it or not. And 1
actually had taken, made steps with my brother to try and borrow some money
from him in order to pay the $900 that she demanded.

Q

So that letter dated June 4l!l that your wife looked at. your ex-wife, that ^ the

first time that you were notified that your claim had been approved0
A
Approved, exactly.
( R. 625). He further testified as follows:

0

A
Q

No, when you - when you represented to Mr. Bishop and your ex-wafe that
you weren't receiving any disability income, but that you would reapply1 foi
it and you might get it. did you believe that to be true0
Absolutely.
Did you know of any facts that would indicate that wasn't true'.'

A

No .". .

(R. 628-9).

Plaintiffs former counsel testified that defendant had represented that he had a

disability policy, that he had made an application, and that the application had been
denied (R. 530. 534-5). This is identical to defendant's testimony.
Plaintiff at trial testified that defendant had represented that "he had been turned
down and that he was going to reapply, but the possibility of getting disability was small"

and that "I le didnT think that he would get any." (R. 549). 'the plaintiff made no effort
to verify the status of the disability claim (R. 567). She admitted at trial that the

disability claim was nol approved until June 4, 1997, several months after the entry of the
decree herein - although it was approved effective April 30, 1997 (R. 571) . She had no

evidence whatsoever that defendant had been approved for disability prior to his receipt
of the June 4, 1997 letter (R. 571-2).

Both parties were aware of the facts in this case. There was simply no
misrepresentation on the part of defendant. Misrepresentation was not plead, and
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certainly- not proved by clear and convincing evidence at tnal. Plaintiff would have had

to have shown at trial that defendant knew at the time the negotiations were taking place
that he would receive the disability. Her own evidence shows that the disability was not
approved for several months after tlie decree was entered.
Y. ALIMONY ADJUSTMENT

The defendant sought to reduce his alimony obligation, due to the fact that he was

not making as much money- as he had previously' or as much as he had planned on when

stipulating to the alimony award. Because of his obligation to pay the Chapter 13
Bankruptcy, child support, alimony, taxes, and support a household in Idaho, he was

actually- losing money on a monthly- basis (R. 168). He did not have the ability to pav
alimony- at the level set by the decree.

Defendant did not make as much money as he had planned because he did not

obtain his license m Utah, and was forced to take a lower paving position in Idaho.
Defendant maintains that he failed to get his license, in part, because of the efforts of the
plaintiff to sabotage his efforts with the Department of Professional Licensure.
The criteria for determining reasonable alimony include the financial condition

and needs of the wife, her ability- to support herself, and die ability of the husband to

provide support. Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144. 147 (Utah 1978); fnglish v.
1-nalish. 565 P,2d 409, 41 1-12 (Utah 1977). It is well grounded in Utah law that the trial
court must consider: '"(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2)

the ability- of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of
the supporting spouse to provide support.'" Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah

App. 1993/. A tnal court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider the enumerated
factors. Willev v. Willev, 866 P.2d 547. 550 (Utah App. 1993). "Thus, 'the trial court

must make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to enable a reviewing court to
ensure that tlie trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon'" the

required factors, kL Accordingly, '"if sufficient findings are not made, we must reverse
unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to allow us to apply the . . factors
as a matter of law on appeal."' kf

A contested petition for modification of a divorce decree is an action tried upon

the facts and requires findings of fact and conclusions of law. Parish v. Parish. 35 P.2d
999 (Utah 1934); Codv v. Cody. 154 P. 952 (Utah 1916). In Chandlery. Wes:, 610 P.2d
1299 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a district court which refused to

modify a stipulated property settlement incorporated in the divorce decree but gave no

explanation for its refusal and made no findings of fact. Instructing the tnal court to enter
proper findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand, the court stated:

When a party, as in the instant case, presents a prima facie case of changed
circumstances which basically raises a serious question as to |the] fairness and
equity of continuing the financial obligations of one party', the court's

determination that modification of a decree is nevertheless inappropriate should be
based on written findings and conclusions. Written findings and conclusions are
just as necessaiy foi the modification of child support as for the alteration or
nonalteration of property settlement arrangements.
Uf at 1301.

The tnal court in this matter should have made findings of fact and conclusions o\~

law regarding the denial of defendant's claim to reduce alimony.
VI. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendant maintains that plaintiff contributed to his failure to gam licensure in

Utah and forced his relocation to Idaho. Defendant thereby lost a lucrative position in
Kanab and earned less money, which was relevant to his claim to seek a reduction in

alimony. Defendant subpoenaed a representative from die Department of Professional
Licensure (DOPL) to appear at tnal and testify' regarding these issues. On October 22.
1998. the DOPL filed a motion for protective order. On October 28. 1998. the court

executed the protective order (R. 375-"*). DOPL did not seek an order shortening time.
and no notice to submit was ever filed.

Rule 4-501(l)(B). Utah Code of Judicial Administration, provides that a party- has
ten days from the date of service of a motion to file a response. After that time, the
matter may be submitted for decision, but the court may not rule on a motion without said

notice being filed. 4-501(1 )(D). The court may grant summary disposition of a motion,

but only where "Upon morion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may grant
a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the essence and
compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the motion
does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily." No such claim

was made by DOPL. and no notice was provided of an expedited disposition. Rule 4-501
was clearly- not complied with. The motion was ruled on before the plaintiff was given
his opportunity to respond. This is reversible error. Gillmor v. Cummings. 806 P.2d
1205 (Utah App. 1991)
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before trial, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the
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request for admissions. As discussed above, the admissions refute the notion that there

was fraud when defendant made the representations regarding the disability pavments and
retirement account. As there was then "no genuine issue as to anv material fact" and

defendant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c). Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not even file an affidavit of any other evidence ir

opposition to the motion for summay judgment. Under Rule 56(e) provides that:
When a motion for summary'judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary'judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

Further, Rule 4-501(2)(B). Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that:

The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which

the partv- contends a genuine issue exists. Lach disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the opposing party relies, and. if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. Ail
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted bv the opposing party's
statement.

Plaintiff failed to follow this procedure. There is no statement as to what facts are

disputed, only a general allegation that defendant "misrepresented" his disability and

retirement. The specific fact that defendant stated that he said he was reapplying for
disability and that he might receive other retirement moneys were not addressed (R. 353-

4). No mention is made of the record, only vague references to discovery not yet filed
with the court. No reference is made to the numbered sentences of movants facts

3.1

Because the plaintiff failed to follow these procedures, the facts are deemed admitted.

They were, ff course, they were already admitted because plaintiff farled to comply' with
discovery.

Because these facts were admitted, there can simply be no cause of action for the

disability or retirement. The plaintiff must show- by clear and convincing evidence that
she has proven each and every element of fraud, and specifically- that defendant knew the
representations were untrue. She acknowledged at trial that she can provide no such

evidence on that issue. She certainly had no such evidence when opposing the motion for
summary judgment. Summary judgment was therefore proper.
MIL ATTORNEYS FEES

The court awarded plaintiff her attorneys fees and costs incurred in pursuing her
petition. The decision to make such an award '"must be based on evidence of die

financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pav. and the

reasonableness of the requested fees."' Willev v. Willey. 866 P.2d 547. 555 (Utah App.
1993) (quoting Bell v. Bell. 810 P,2d 489. 493 (Utah App. 1991)). The failure to consider
anv of the enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee issue. Willey, 866 P.2d at
556; Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73. 77 (Utah App. 1991). See Willev. 866 P.2d at
555 ('"We have consistently encouraged trial courts to make findings to explain the

factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney' fee award."')
The trial court here made no findings as to this issue. As discussed above, the

defendant testified that he did not have the money to meet his living expenses - how then
can he have the ability to pay plaintiffs fees0 Further, he testified that he did not have
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the funds to pay his own counsel (R. 642-3). This issue should be returned to the trial
court so that adequate findings may be made.
CONCLUSION

This court can not properly review this matter as the trial court did not is*>ue and
findings of fact and conclusions of law. These are required in divorce modifications
under Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985) and Rule 52(b). Utah K. Civ. P

(2000). The case must be remanded for additional findings. This issue should be
remanded to the trial court. This issue is so clear, and the opposition to the appeal so
unwarranted, that defendant should be awarded his costs incurred herein.

The trial court improperly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw requests for
admissions made prior to trial. Although the court made no findings regarding this issue,
given the evidence presented the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Langeland v.
Monarch Motors, inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). The court should reverse the trial
court on this issue.

The court found that defendant had misrepresented the amount of his disabilitypayments and retirement account. However, because this was a stipulated decree, to

succeed on these issues the plaintiff must show fraud on the part of defendant Land v.

Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) and Kinsman v. KJnsman.748 P.2d 210 (Utah App.
1988). Plaintiff did not plead fraud, and admitted at trial that she had no evidence that
defendant knew the statements to be untrue, there was therefore no misrepresentation.
These issues should likewise be reversed, and these cause of actions dismissed.

The tnal court denied defendant's petition to reduce alimony and awarded plaintif:
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attorneys fees. Finding as to tlie financial abilities of the parties is required for such a
determination. The court failed make such findings, and the case must be remanded on
these issues. Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144. 147 (Utah 197S); Willev v. Willev. Son

P.2d 54". 555 (Utah App. 1993); Chandlery. West. 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980) These
issues should be remanded to the trial court.

Finally', defendant filed a motion summary judgment. Because plaintiff had failed
to respond to discovery, no facts were in dispute. In any case, defendant did not properlv
respond to the motion under Rule 56. Utah R. Civ. P. (2000). or Rule 4-501. Utah Code

of Jud. Admin. (2000). Summary judgment should have entered, and the court should
reverse the trial court on that issue.

The trial court should be reversed, and summary

judgment granted on tlie issues of the disability and retirement account.
Dated this 18th day of July. 2000.

Samuel G. Draper
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I. Samuel G. Draper, certify that on July 18th, 2000 I served two copies of the
attached Brief of Appellant upon Michael W. Park, the counsel for the appellee in this
matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the
following address:
Michael W. Park

Park. Park& Barnes. PC.
P.O. Box 2438

St. Geome. UT 84771

Samuel G. Draper
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ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHLEEN WILLIAMS MOSDELL,

ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
v.

DALE McBRIDE MOSDELL.
Ca.se No.
Defendant.

974500109

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

This case came before the Coun on November {\ 1999 on a renewed hearing recardiniz three
matters presently pending before the Coun: (1) Plaintiffs Verified Petition to Modifv Decree of

Divorce; (2) Defendant's First Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce: and i3 ! Plaintiffs

Request that the Answers to Defendant's First Discovery Request be Accepted by the Coun. Plaintiff
was present at the hearing with her attorney of record. Michael W. Park. Defendant was not present,
however, but was represented by his attorney nf record. Jefiery D. Rurseil.

Having fully reviewed the evidence presented at the January 14. 1999 Bench Tnal, and having
heard supplemental arguments and received supplemental motions and memoranda, the Coun finds
that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the issuance of the May 21. 1997 Decree
ol Divorce—namely that a substantial change has occurred in the reported financial circumstances and
place ol residence of the parties, and that the former Decree was based upon misrepresentations made
bv Defendant recardinii his finances. As a result, the Court now enters the following:

ORDER

1. The Answers to Defendant's first discovery requests, which were sinned on the 13" dav o\
July 1998 in trial, with copies submitted to the Defendant at that time, are herebv adm.tted.

2. Plaintiff is awarded an addit onal sum of So.000 above the original a'imonv award because
of the previously undisclosed disability income received by Defendant. Other than this modification,
alimony is to continue as previously ordered by tlie Court.
3. As an equitable distribution of marital property. Plaintiff is awarded a sum of $ 24.353 .SO.

which is half of S48.707.59 previously unreported by Defendant from his retirement program.
4. As compensation lor Defendant's obligation to pay 90% of all uncovered medical bills as
required by paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff is awarded a sum of $787 for medical and
therapeutic expenses incurred by Plaintiff for the benefit of the parties" minor children.

5. As compensation tor Defendant's failure to comply with the personal propertv distribution
award contained in paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff is awarded a sum of S750 for the
purchase of an upright freezer.

6. Defendant is hereby ordered, in accordance with paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce, to

deliver all family photographs to Plaintiff, or to pay immediately the costs of reproducing the same
using the original negatives, and to deliver the reproductions to Plaintiff.

7. Because the evidence presented at trial regarding the parties remaining persona! propertv
was inconclusive, the Court makes no further orders enforcing or modifying the paragraph 14 of the
original Decree of Divorce.
8. Because the parties' third child. Mandi (born May 4. 1981). recently reached the age of

majority. Child Support is hereby reduced from the $1500 amount contained within 'he decree to
SI.000 per month.

9. Defendants rights of reasonable visitation shall be those set forth in the rrovisions of Utah
Coae Ann. § 30-3-35 (1997). a copy of which is attached and incorporated bv this reference. Further
Defendant*5 rights of visitation shall include the following:
(A) Defendant, should he choose to do so. may have the children visit with him for a
period ot six weeks during the summer.

(B) Defendant is to travel to Cedar City to pick up and return the children durine all
assigned visitation periods, except Lhat during Thanksgiving. Christmas, and Summer visitation
penods Defendant and Plaintiff are to meet and exchange the children at their daughter Marci's
home in Provo/Orem.

10. In compliance with paragraph 22 of the Decree of Divorce. Defendant is to designate the
parties adult and minor children as beneficiaries of the $300,000 life insurance policv.
11. In compliance with paragraph 16 of the Decree of Divorce. Defendant is directed to

immediately provide Plaintiff with a medical insurance card listing the name of his insurer and his
medical insurance policy number.

12. Plaintiff is awarded a sum of S670. which is one half of S13-0 in attorney fees paid bv her
in conjunction with the parties Idalio divorce proceedings.
13. Plaintiff is awarded S6.800 for the attorney's fees and costs associated with bringing her
Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.

Dated this

^^

dav of November. 1999.

ROBERT T. BRAITIIWAITE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY

U_ IjM'f C-f i

I certify that on this i^ —'Y(._. day ofOctober. 1949 1provided true and correct copies of
the foreeoimi ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE: to each of the attorneys named below

bv placing acopy in the United States Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Samuel G. Draper
187 N 100 W

St. George UT S4770
Michael \V. Park
P.O. Box 2430

St. Geome

Ut 84771

-'J\ \YiiA L[

:_Li_ JiJA^jJl.

DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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